Critical infrastructures are highly interconnected both within an infrastructure sector and with one another. In many cases, there are also cyber systems that provide information or control to those infrastructures. Those dependencies can lead to unexpected consequences in the event of an incident. Simulation models that account for dependencies are critical to gain insight. This document provides an overview of accounting for dependencies in constructing simulation models and some of the associated challenges. The 9-1-1 system provides an example of a highly connected critical infrastructure system.
INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures are highly interconnected. These interconnections exist at a variety of levels, from within an individual infrastructure sector to across sectors. For example in electric power and communications, a number of independent entities must work together for the infrastructure to be able to provide service. These infrastructure sectors also depend on each other. Communications systems need power to operate, while electric power needs communications services, sometimes leased from commercial providers, for its control system.
Dependencies may be functional in nature such as electric power generating plants needing fuel to operate. They may be geographic, e.g. a petroleum facility that is connected to a specific electric power substation. Dependencies often include human decision makers, and also contractual, treaty, or regulatory constraints.
Dependencies can cause unexpected consequences and cascading failures. In the August 2003 Northeast Blackout, the interdependency between electric power utilities and a combination of human decision and malfunctioning equipment caused a cascading outage that affected an estimated 50 million people at its peak [1] . Restoration after Hurricane Sandy took longer due to unavailable roads and challenges in obtaining fuel for work crews [2] .
Mental models are not sufficient to capture the complexities, so carefully designed simulation models are needed.
DEFINING THE SYSTEM
The first step in building a simulation model is deciding on the spatial and temporal boundaries of the system. Several key questions drive those boundaries. The first is, "What does the model need to be able to answer, for what type of incident(s), and for what duration (i.e., does it include response and recovery)?" The second is, "Which infrastructure system(s) need to be included in the model to answer those question(s)?" The question(s) will drive additional data needs, such as assets that allow the system to provide the functions being modeled, the connectivity of those assets, and the necessary attributes of the assets.
For example, to model the 9-1-1 system, we may start with the system as shown in Figure 1 . Simulating the system shown in Figure 1 would tell an analyst whether the system was capable of dispatching emergency responders. The assets depicted are the public safety answering point (PSAP) which houses a dispatcher that dispatches emergency services vehicles or responders in the field. In order to dispatch services, the dispatcher uses a computer system connected to an information technology (IT) network with local resources and resources accessed over the Internet. The dispatcher can use a radio, the computer aided dispatch system (CAD), or a cellular phone. The emergency services vehicle will have a console that is also part of the CAD system, a vehicle mounted radio, and the emergency responder. The emergency responder will have a handheld radio, and a cellular phone used Copyright is held by author/owner(s).
for communication when they are outside of the vehicle. The data services associated with the CAD system also have several dependencies. CAD communicates over the radio system or the cellular network depending on the design, and requires a GPS signal to know where the emergency services vehicle is located. The CAD system uses location information to determine the optimal vehicle to dispatch given the location of a particular emergency.
Figure 1. The 9-1-1 System
What at first glance seems to be a simple life safety system in reality is far more complex, even with restrictive boundaries. The dependencies depicted in the system as described are the cellular network (phones and towers), the radio system (towers), the transportation system (roads), local IT systems, and satellite assets (GPS).
There are also hidden dependencies not shown in Figure 1 , which may need to be modeled explicitly or accounted for as exogenous inputs, or excluded from consideration depending on the disruption. In many cases, criminal databases are not located on site and Internet access is required. The cellular and radio towers and PSAP rely on the electric grid for operation. The PSAP may also need water for cooling. The emergency services vehicle needs fuel. If the disruptions are limited to the assets shown in Figure 1 , then the dependencies are already captured in the system.
ACCOUNTING FOR DEPENDENCIES
As alluded to above, the disruptions applied to the model can significantly expand the system of interest and the elements included. So can the questions being asked of the model. Our original 9-1-1 system just accounted for the dispatcher and the dispatched resources. The reason for dispatching resources is missing. If instead of answering the question, "Can resources be dispatched?" the model answered the question, "Can an individual call 9-1-1 and get the appropriate resources dispatched to them?" we would need to define the system as shown in Figure 2 . Now the left-hand side of the figure includes the caller making a call and the resources needed to connect that call. In the figure, the caller can use a cellular phone or a landline phone to call for help. The cellular call traverses the cellular network using a similar set of resources as CAD or the dispatcher making a call (i.e., towers and mobile switching centers). If the caller uses a landline phone, the call uses a wire center to route to the PSAP. Figure 2 also includes the wire center that contains the resources needed to route the call from the cellular or landline phone network to the PSAP.
Data Challenges
Subject matter expertise and creation of model-ready data can be sufficient for building a high-level model that does not need geospatial resolution or anything beyond functional dependencies. The as-built system works and is providing services. With that level of understanding, a subject matter expert can build a model provided the appropriate model-ready data exists. If the model needs to be of sufficient fidelity that geospatial dependencies (e.g., service territories), specific mitigations, and temporal factors matter (e.g., are 9-1-1 resources dispatched in time to be effective) then interdependency compounds the normal model building process.
Geospatial location of assets matter when determining impacted assets, or when accounting for geographic dependencies. In the example in Figure 2 , the location of the 9-1-1 caller will determine which cellular tower and mobile switching center, or which wire center routes the call. If an incident disrupts that wire center, cellular tower, or mobile switching center the call will not connect.
Figure 2. Broader View of the 9-1-1 System
Even the best available data from commercial or public sources contain inaccuracies. Inaccuracies in location can move an asset out of one service territory into another, or change whether it is impacted by a given event. Some of the uncertainties can be accounted for using probabilistic methods; others are much more challenging and can drastically alter results. The desired information may not be public or easily available. For example, contractual information, which governs interconnects between the telephony network and switching for 9-1-1 calls, is not typically publicly available. In addition, factors such as the specific power line a facility is connected to may only be known with certainty by the electric power utility. Partnerships with system owners and operators are critical to obtaining some of these details and developing and validating heuristics.
Impacts of Incident Duration
Currently, the example system primarily accounts for day-to-day operations of 9-1-1. There are redundancies built into this system to isolate it from some of its dependences. For example, the dispatcher can send resources using the CAD system, the radio system, or the cellular network. Due to its status as a life safety infrastructure, the system is also isolated from electric power disruption to some extent. The impacts of an electric power disruption and the dependencies that need to be accounted for will vary based on the duration of the incident and the mitigation plans that exist within the system. In the 9-1-1 system, the specifics of some of these mitigations are regulatory; others are specific to the system as constructed by the owner/operator. Figure 3 shows the duration of some of the electric power mitigations that exist in the 9-1-1 system. Starting with placing a call, cordless landline phones will fail immediately with the power outage at sites that do not have backup power. Cellular phones will continue to operate for the duration of backup at the cellular towers, or about eight to eighteen hours, depending on system design. Non-cordless landline phones will continue to operate as long as there is power at the wire center. Wire centers have backup generators with two to three days of fuel on site.
Moving to the PSAP, the facility itself will typically also have backup generation with two to three days of fuel on site. The radio system to connect the dispatcher to the vehicles or the responders will have repeaters that have either battery backup or generators. The length of time those can operate without power or refueling varies from system to system. This is an area where a partnership with the system owner or operator is critical to obtaining the necessary level of detail.
For CAD systems that use the cellular network, their backup durations are the same as those for cellular calls: eight to eighteen hours at the tower, and two to three days at the mobile switching center. Cellular providers have equipment and procedures to provide additional backup power to a limited number of facilities as needed in the event of an emergency. The details on these procedures and the equipment available will be specific to that cellular provider.
The emergency services vehicle will need fuel to continue its operation. Larger communities typically have local fuel depots for vehicles so they are not subject directly to commercial fuel supply issues during an incident. The amount of fuel at these depots varies from community to community. Smaller communities may have to rely on commercial supplies.
In this example, incidents that cause electric power outages of shorter than eight hours will have no impact aside from households and businesses that only have cordless landline phones to place calls. Once the impact goes beyond that eighthour window, cellular services will start to fail and modeling will need to account for electric power restoration priority, the conditions of roads, and the potential to bring in alternate power sources. Once the outage moves into the space of days, dependencies on fuel providers appear, as well as competition for the fuel between facilities. Thus the length and type of incident dictates which dependencies will be necessary to include in the model.
Endless Scope Creep?
The criticality of defining the system of study and the type and duration of incident is easily seen by drilling down further into the sample system. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones are not a part of the system defined in the example. VoIP phones are increasingly Figure 3 . Timing Concerns in Electric Power Dependencies common at both residential and business sites. Typically, the service provider is a non-traditional telephony carrier such as cable companies, or even traditional landline carriers using fiber to the home. Similar to cordless landline phones, unless there is backup power at the customer site, these phones fail the instant the power goes out. Additionally, they depend on connections from the customer site through the carrier's network (typically Internet-based facilities) until they reach an interconnection at a wire center with a traditional landline phone company.
The Internet facilities will have generators for backup power with up to 2-3 days of fuel on site, though it is not a regulatory requirement. Many of these facilities will also require water for cooling. Depending on the design of the water utility, electric pumps may be needed to deliver water to the facility. The water utility may or may not have backup generation for use in the event of a power outage. The Internet facility will have a limited operating time in the event of loss of water for cooling. Wire centers and mobile switching centers also require water for cooling in many cases.
All of the generators will require refueling if the power outage lasts longer than the on-site fuel capacity. Refueling requires transportation assets that rely on fuel and clear roadways for their operation. Sites used to load fuel on to fuel trucks also need electric power. In a significant event, facilities may compete with one another for both generators and the fuel that supplies them. Established contractual arrangements with national fuel suppliers that can provide fuel from outside the impacted area may be key to maintaining function.
Electric power restoration also requires vehicles for the work crews and clear roads. In addition, the control systems for electric power may rely on wire centers or Internet facilities that are operating on generator backup. Restoring electric power becomes more difficult and takes longer without an operational control system [3] . In this manner, the model can quickly become as complex as the real system.
CONCLUSIONS
In order to account for dependencies in simulation models, the system must be defined in relation to the incident and question(s) being addressed. Failing to appropriately bound the system under study can easily result in a model that either will not be usable for the incident of interest, or can quickly become extremely complex and intractable. The duration of a specific incident can change the dependencies that need to be considered and accounted for in model construction.
When accounting for dependencies, the details of the specific system will matter. Functional dependencies may involve heuristics or knowledge of regulatory requirements. Dependencies that are geographic or related to mitigation processes and procedures will require details from a variety of different entities. For example, the electric power utility knows the specifics on electric power restoration priority, the telecommunications carrier knows how much generator fuel they have on site and who their refueling contract is with, and the backup fuel provider knows where its storage sites are and how they work. Partnerships with the different entities is crucial to obtaining those details.
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